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UNITED STATES GYPSUM: PRICE VERIFICATION:
CONTROLLING CIRCUMSTANCES OR
CONTROLLING PRICES

H.
I.

KENNETH KUDONt
INTRODUCTION

F

OR MORE THAN HALF A CENTURY teachers and students of
antitrust law, practitioners, and businessmen alike marched to
the beat of the same drummer: price fixing is illegal "per se," and, as
such, it is inadvisable for businessmen to exchange price information with their competitors. Once in a while it appeared that the
drummer had missed a beat,' but he always picked up the cadence and the beat went on . . . until recently, when the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rendered what some consider
to be an off-beat decision in United States v. United States Gypsum
Co. 2
In Gypsum, the Third Circuit reversed a jury verdict of section 1
Sherman Act violations by four gypsum manufacturers and certain
officers of gypsum firms.3 Those defendants and nine others had
been indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiring, among other
things, to raise, fix, maintain and stabilize the prices of gypsum
board or "wall board" as it is commonly known. 4
The wall board industry is oligopolistic; the corporate appellants
together account for more than seventy-five percent of national wall
board sales.5 Wall board has replaced plaster as the principal
component of interior walls in buildings.6 It was established at trial
that the product was fairly standardized in quality and appearance,
and that demand was inelastic with respect to price.7 Accordingly,

t B.A., University of Alabama, 1968; J.D., University of Tennessee, 1970.
Member, District of Columbia, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee Bars.
1. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); United

States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231 (1918).
2. 550 F.2d 115 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977).
3. 550 F.2d at 117-18. Section one of the Sherman Act reads in pertinent part:

"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
4. 550 F.2d at 117.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.

(688)
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price was the dominant factor in the buyers' decisions to purchase
the product. 8
The Government offered proof at trial that the defendants had
used numerous methods to fix prices in violation of the Sherman
Act. 9 One of these alleged methods was an exchange of price
information pursuant to which an official of one company would
verify a competitor's pending price offer to a specific customer by
telephoning an official of the competitor. 10 The defendants conceded
the existence of-such calls during the statute of limitations period,
but asserted that they were for the lawful purpose of ensuring
compliance with the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act
(Robinson-Patman Act)," which prohibits sellers from discriminating in price to different purchasers of the same commodity. The
defendants argued that the verifications were intended to establish
the section 2(b) Robinson-Patman Act defense which excuses
discriminatory price offerings where the "lower price ... was made
in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor ....,,12
The Government presented evidence that during the period when
these exchanges took place, prices rose and remained stable
notwithstanding overcapacity conditions in the industry. 3 The trial
judge charged that if the jury found the appellants' telephone
verifications had the effect of stabilizing prices, the defendants
would be guilty under the Sherman Act, and the purpose for the
verifications, such as promoting compliance with the RobinsonPatman Act was irrelevant. 4 The Third Circuit reversed the trial
court, and held that the jury was not properly apprised that
"controlling circumstances" can exempt price information ex-

8.Id. In the words of the Third Circuit, "[b]ecause of the homogeneity of the
different brands, a buyer's decision to purchase one particular brand is generally
based on price. Price discounts and changes in credit terms are the most important
form of competition in the industry." Id.
9. Id.at 118, 120.
10. Id. at 120. The court stated: "The Government contends that the purpose of
verification was to enable competitors to stabilize prices and 'police' agreed-upon
increases, that the calls involved broad discussions of present and future pricing
policies, that the appellants verified daily, and that they continued to do so until
1973." Id.
11. Id. at 121, citing the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C.
13-13c, 21a (1976).
12. 550 F.2d at 121, quoting 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976). The defendants claimed that
they had three choices: (1) offer the reduced price on the basis of the purchaser's
unconfirmed report and risk Robinson-Patman liability; (2) forego the price cut and
risk losing the sale; or (3) call the competitor, verify his offer, and establish a section
2(b) defense to any Robinson-Patman charge concerning the price cut. 550 F.2d at 122.
13. 550 F.2d at 127.
14. See id.at 120-21, 126-27.
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changes from the proscriptions of section 1 of the Sherman Act
under United States v. Container Corp. of America.15 According to
the Third Circuit, the jury should have been instructed that
defendants' conduct would not violate the Sherman Act if their
motive was compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act, the defendants believed their buyers were lying about lower price offers by
other competitors, they were unable to obtain independent corroboration of their buyers' representations, and their communication was
strictly limited to such verification. 16 The Supreme Court has
7
granted certiorari to United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,'
and may decide whether compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act
justifies price exchanges and thus constitutes a valid defense
against price fixing. 18
The purpose of this article is to examine the underpinnings of
the court of appeals decision in Gypsum, to determine whether the
result was consonant with the objectives of the antitrust laws as
expressed by Congress, and finally to recommend a means of
reconciling the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts.
II. THE PER SE RuLE IN PRICE-FIXING CASES
An understanding of the tension in the case law which has
resulted from the Third Circuit decision in Gypsum requires a basic
review of the per se rule in price fixing cases. Although United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co.' 9 was the first case to rule that price
fixing is a per se violation of the Sherman Act, irrespective of the
effect on competition, it was by no means the first case to hold price
fixing agreements illegal. 20 Among the earliest price-fixing cases
to involve price information exchanges was American Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States.2' In that case the Government
challenged an "Open Competition Plan" adopted by an association
of hardwood manufacturers. 22 The plan called for daily reporting of

15. Id. at 127. For a discussion of United States v. Container Corp. of America,
393 U.S. 333 (1969), see text accompanying notes 112-34 infra.
16. 550 F.2d at 126.
17. 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977).
18. See 550 F.2d at 123 & n.9.
19. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
21. 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
22. Id. at 391. The significance of the association's policy on competition is
demonstrated by the fact that association members produced one-third of the total
production in the United States, although they operated only one-twentieth of the
mills engaged in hardwood manufacturing. Id.
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production inventory and price lists for regular dissemination to
association members, supplemented by monthly m'eetings to discuss
the disseminated information. 23 The plan was found illegal because,
taken as a whole, it caused concerted action of competitors to control
prices. 24 Significantly, there was much evidence that the purpose of
the agreement was to raise prices. 25 A solicitation appeal to
hardwood manufacturers to join in the Open Competition Plan
stated: "Knowledge regarding prices actually made is all that is
'26
necessary to keep prices at reasonably stable and normal levels.
The price information exchange agreement in United States v.
American Linseed Oil Co. 27 was more stringent in its requirements.
Failure to abide by the agreement was punishable by forfeiture of
bonds which had been deposited by the participants. 2 After
discussing the economic effects of the agreement, the Supreme Court
found it to be unlawful. 29 In the words of the Court, the association
members' "manifest purpose was to defeat the Sherman Act without
subjecting themselves to its penalties." 30
In the foregoing cases, it is submitted, the Supreme Court
exhibited restraint in failing to flatly condemn the price exchange
agreements based upon their probable consequences. Instead, the
Court took pains to scrutinize the purpose of the agreements. 31 When

23. Id. at 393-99.
24. Id. at 400. In the Supreme Court's analysis:
It has been repeatedly held by this court that the purpose of the ...
[Sherman Act] is to maintain free competition in interstate commerce and that
any concerted action by any combination of men or corporations to cause, or
which in fact does cause, direct and undue restraint of competition in such
commerce falls within the condemnation of the act and is unlawful.
Id.
25. Id. at 411-12. In Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563
(1925), the Supreme Court later held that trade association activities which included
the exchange of information on average costs, freight rates, and inventory, without
the identification of specific customers, were reasonable and thus not in violation of
the Sherman Act. Id. at 586. Maple Flooring distinguished the trade association
activity in American Column & Lumber on the basis of the earlier case's
anticompetitive purpose. Id. at 577. In the later case, Maple Flooring,the Court found
the record "barren of evidence tending to establish that there [was] ... any
agreement or purpose or intention on the part of defendants to produce any effect
upon commerce ..
" Id. The Maple Flooring Court also indicated that there was no
evidence tending to show the trade association activities actually affected prices. Id.
at 567.
26. 257 U.S. at 393.
27. 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
28. Id. at 382.
29. Id. at 390.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 577 (1925);
United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 390 (1923); American
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411-12 (1921).
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it was satisfied that not only the effect but also the purpose of the
agreements was anticompetitive, the Court declared the agreements
unlawful under the Sherman Act.32
The Court's concern for the purpose of the agreements in
American Column and Lumber and American Linseed Oil demonstrates the influence of Justice Brandeis' preoccupation with the
element of "purpose. '33 Brandeis wrote the majority opinion in
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 34 where the Government
sued to enjoin the use of a "Call" rule employed by the defendants.3 5
Under the rule, grain futures prices were frozen at the end of each
business day; after the Board had closed, members could purchase
certain grain only at that day's closing bid. 36 In the trial court,
[t]he defendants admitted the adoption and enforcement of the
Call rule, and averred that its purpose was not to prevent
competition or to control prices, but to promote the convenience
of members by restricting their hours of business and to break
up a monopoly in that branch of the grain trade acquired by four
or five warehousemen in Chicago. 37
The Government's motion to strike from the record the defendants'
allegations with respect to purpose was granted.3 8 After an
evidentiary hearing at which the Government proved the existence
of the rule and its application, the trial court granted the
injunction. 39 The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision. 40

32. See, e.g., United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923);
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
33. See, e.g., American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 415
(Brandeis & McKenna, JJ., dissenting). Here Justice Brandeis stated in dissent "it
was neither the aim of the Plan, nor the practice under it, to regulate competition in
any way. Its purpose was to make rational competition possible by supplying data not
otherwise available and without which most of those engaged in the trade would be
unable to trade intelligently." Id. This was the primary reason that the dissenters
would have upheld the Open Competition Plan. Id. at 416.
One report suggests that the prevailing view in the early 20th Century was
that trade associations served a worthwhile purpose by collecting statistics and other
information for the improvement of the industry. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 17
(1955) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST LAws]. See also Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n
v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925); Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268
U.S. 563 (1925).
34. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
35. Id. at 237.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 237-38.
40. Id. at 241.
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In an oft-quoted passage of the opinion, 41 Brandeis stated:
The case was rested upon the bald proposition, that a rule or
agreement by which men occupying positions of strength in any
branch of trade, fixed prices ... is an illegal restraint of trade
under the ... Sherman Act. But the legality of an agreement or
regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test as whether
it restrains competition. . . .The true test of legality is whether
the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to
the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are
all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save
an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to
42
predict consequences.
The Court concluded that the trial court had erred in striking the
defendants' allegations with respect to purpose and "in later
excluding evidence on that subject." 43
Justice Brandeis' "rule of reason" analysis of Sherman Act
cases was found inapplicable in price-fixing situations by United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co. 44 In that case, the existence of an
agreement to fix prices and limit sales was not disputed. 45 The
defendants, however, sought to introduce exonerating evidence, e.g.,
proof that the specific prices set by the agreement were "reasonable," and therefore, not an unreasonable restraint of trade in
violation of the Sherman Act. 46 The trial court had instructed the
jury that if it found the existence of agreements or combinations as
alleged by the government, it could return a guilty verdict without
regard to the reasonableness of the prices fixed or the good

41. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1967).
See also United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 116, citing Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
42. 246 U.S. at 238.
43. Id. at 238-39.
44. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
45. Id. at 394. The 20 individual and 23 corporate defendants collectively
accounted for 82% of the manufacture and distribution of vitreous pottery fixtures in

the United States. Id. at 393-94.
46. Id. at 395.
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intentions of the participants. 47 The trial court refused the defense
request to charge the jury as follows: "The essense of the law is
injury to the public. It is not every restraint of competition. . . that
works an injury to the public; it is only an undue and unreasonable
restraint of trade that has such an effect and is deemed to be
unlawful. ' '4 8 The trial court also refused to include in the charge to
the jury Justice Brandeis' passage on the rule of reason from
49
Chicago Board of Trade.

The United States Supreme Court upheld the trial court and
reversed the court of appeals in Trenton Potteries,holding that price
fixing is per se unlawful, and inquiry into the reasonableness of the
prices agreed to is irrelevant.50 The Court reasoned that the danger
inherent in the power to fix prices was sufficient to find all such
agreements unreasonable, and therefore per se illegal.5 1 In reaching
its decision, the Court also stated that the basic assumption of the
Sherman Act was that the public could best be protected from the
evils of monopoly and price control by the maintenance of
unrestrained competition.5 2 The natural effect of price fixing, in the
Court's view, was to lessen competition.5 3
The holding in Trenton Potteries stemmed from the conceded
fact that the defendant had agreed with others to control the price of
sanitary pottery.5 4 There was no question that the defendants'
purpose in joining the agreement was to fix prices.5 5 Thus, there was
47. Id. The Supreme Court agreed with this jury instruction. In the words of
Justice Stone, "[t]he power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves
power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The
reasonable price fixed today may through economic and business changes become the
unreasonable price of tomorrow." Id. at 397.
48. Id. at 395. The defendants had encouraged the trial judge to instruct the jury
that the agreements to fix prices and limit sales would not be unlawful unless they
unreasonably restrained trade. Id.
49. Id. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.

50. 273 U.S. at 397-98.

51. Id. The Court distinguished Chicago Board of Trade, where an agreement to
fix prices during certain hours of the day in a closed market was upheld under the rule

of reason approach. See 246 U.S. at 238-39. See also text accompanying notes 34-43
supra. In the words of the Trenton Potteries Court, in Chicago Board of Trade:
The purpose and effect of the agreement ... was to maintain for a part of each
business day the price which had been that day determined by open competition
on the floor of the Exchange. That decision, dealing as it did with a regulation of
a board of trade, does not sanction a price agreement among competitors in an
open market such as is presented here.
273 U.S. at 401.
52. Id. at 397.
53. Id. The Court concluded, "[a]greements which create such potential power
may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the
necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable
as fixed." Id.
54. Id. at 394.
55. See id. at 396-97.
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no issue raised as to whether the agreement itself constituted a
"contract, combination .. . or conspiracy" for purposes of the
Sherman Act, 56 or whether the defendants were entitled to rebut the
existence of such a contract, combination, or conspiracy with
evidence that their conduct was for an entirely lawful purpose. 57 The
only substantive issue raised was whether the price fixing agree58
ment unreasonably restrained trade.
In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 59 the seminal pricefixing case, the United States Supreme Court reiterated the per se
approach adopted in Trenton Potteries.60 In Socony-Vacuum, the
course of conduct by defendant oil companies had the effect of
increasing the price levels of gasoline.6 ' Unlike Trenton Potteries,
the existence in Socony of an agreement to fix prices was not
conceded. Instead, it was an element of the offense required to be
proven by the Government. 62 Pursuant to a program which had its
genesis in the National Industrial Recovery Act (N.I.R.A.) period,
but continued after the N.I.R.A. was declared unconstitutional, 63 the
principal integrated oil companies doing business in the Midwest
purchased the surplus gasoline of their independent competitors at
or below the prevailing spot price. 64 Although this gasoline
constituted 17% of the amount marketed in the Midwest,6 5 the
program established a floor under the spot market level through the
removal of gasoline which otherwise would have sold at distress

56. Id. at 394. For the text of § 1 of the Sherman Act, see note 3 supra.
57. It is submitted that once a plaintiff establishes the existence of price fixing,
the defendants should not be permitted to show the reasonableness of the restraint.
The Trenton PotteriesCourt, however, declined to remove that issue from the purview
of the trial court.
58. See 273 U.S. at 395-402.
59. 310 U.S. 150 (1940), rev'd, 105 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1939).
60. Id. at 210-12. Although 27 corporations and 56 individuals were originally
brought to trial, the respondents in the Supreme Court appeal numbered only 12
corporations and 5 individuals. Id. at 165 n.1.
61. Id. at 174.
62. Id. at 167-68.
63. See National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195 (1933); Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935) (presidential power to establish
codes of fair competition under § 3 of the N.I.R.A. constitutes excessive delegation of
legislative power); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935)
(presidential power to prohibit transportation of unlawfully produced "hot oil" under
§ 9(c) of the N.I.R.A. unconstitutional).
64. 310 U.S. at 166. The standard forms of trading are "spot sales" - those for
immediate delivery from a local producer or distributor, "future sales" - agreements
for delivery in a future month, and sales "to arrive" - agreements to deliver on
arrival a product or commodity in transit. See also Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 236 (1918).
65. 310 U.S. at 195.
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prices. 66 It was argued that the defendants' actions were justified
because they were countenanced by officers of the federal government,6 7 eliminated competitive evils, 68 and were not the primary
cause of price increases in the industry.6 9 The trial court charged the
jury that it was a violation of the Sherman Act for a group of
individuals or corporations to act together to raise the prices to be
charged for the commodity which they manufactured where they
"controlled a substantial part of the interstate trade and commerce
in that commodity." 70 The trial court further instructed that the
reasonableness of prices, the existence of other reasons for the price
inflation, the knowledge or acquiescence of government officers, and
the good intentions of the members of the combination were
irrelevant to the question of guilt or innocence. 71 The United States
Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit held the charge to be
reversible error, since the reasonableness of the defendants' conduct
72
had not been submitted to the jury.
Justice Douglas in his majority opinion distinguished Chicago
Board of Trade, stating that "no attempt was made [in that case] to
show that the purpose or effect of the rule was to raise or depress
prices. ' 73 He went on to point out that in Socony there was ample
evidence that the combination had the purpose to raise prices and
that the program contributed to a price increase. 74 Justice Douglas
devoted considerable space to the argument, frequently advanced by
defendants, that their actions were aimed at eliminating competitive
evils and not competition. 75 Justice Douglas looked to our economic
system and the purposes the Congress expected to serve in enacting
the Sherman Act, 76 and warned of the evil of any group's power to

66. Id. at 220. "Distress gasoline" was defined by Justice Douglas as "gasoline
which the refiner could not store, for which he had no regular sales outlets and which
therefore he had to sell for whatever price it would bring." Id. at 171.
67. Id. at 225-26. The Court stated that although Congress could legitimately
utilize the same methods for the same objectives as the defendants, this did not mean
that they or anyone else could do so without Congressional approval. Id.
68. Id.at 163.
69. Id. The Court noted that the distressed oil industry was so acutely harmed by
overproduction that Congress enacted §9(c) of the N.I.R.A. to prohibit the
transportation of unlawfully produced oil. Id. at 171-73. For the subsequent history of
§ 9(c), see note 63 supra.

70. 310 U.S. at 210.
71. Id. at 210-11.

72. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 105 F.2d 809, 827 (7th Cir. 1939).
73. 310 U.S. at 217.
74. Id. at 219. Justice Douglas stated, moreover, that it was immaterial whether
other factors might have contributed to the rise and stability of the spot market
prices. Id.
75. Id. at 220-21.
76. Id. at 220-23.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 4
1977-1978]

PRICE VERIFICATION

maintain an administered price system. 77 But he also made clear
that the per se rule is not limited to combinations which exercise or
possess monopoly power over pricing.78 In his words, "[a]ny
combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in an
unlawful activity.... Congress has not left with us the determination of whether or not particular price fixing schemes are wise or
unwise, healthy or destructive. 79
Although it is widely acknowledged that Socony broadened the
scope of unlawful price fixing to include any concerted action which
tampers with price structures,8 0 there is language in the decision
which could arguably lead one to conclude that Justice Douglas was
using the word "combination" only as a simple means of reference to
the participants in the unlawful restraint of trade, and that in order
to establish the unlawful combination or conspiracy it is necessary
to establish "purpose" and "effect." 8' After discussing the evils of
price maintenance, Justice Douglas states: "Under the Sherman Act
a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising,
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity
' 82
is illegal per Be."
However, Justice Douglas wrote elsewhere in the opinion that
"[p]roof that a combination was formed for the purpose of fixing
prices and that it caused them to be fixed or contributed to that
result is proof of the completion of a price fixing conspiracy ....
83
He also explained that since an antitrust violation could be found
even where the conspiracy had fallen short of its objective, it was not
necessary to prove both anticompetitive purpose and the power to fix
4
prices.8
It can thus be concluded that Justice Douglas did not believe
both purpose and effect were necessary to establish an unlawful
price fixing conspiracy. Whether Justice Douglas would have found

77. Id. at 221. The Court further stated that "[e]ven though the members of the
price-fixing group were in no position to control the market, to the extent that they
raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would be directly interfering with the free
play of market forces." Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS at 3 & n.9 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS], quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
81. See 310 U.S. at 223.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 224, 224-25 n.59. Justice Douglas noted, "it is well established that a
person 'may be guilty of conspiring although incapable of committing the objective
offense.'" Id. at 224-25 n.59, quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 238 U.S. 78, 86
(1915).
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an unlawful price fixing conspiracy if the effect, but not the purpose,
were to fix prices is less clear. It can be argued that the plaintiff has
the burden of proving the combination was formed or utilized for the
purpose of fixing prices before the court can apply the per se rule
excluding evidence of purpose. In other words, once an unlawful
conspiracy is proven, justifications for or defenses against the
conspiracy should not be entertained. Until such proof is offered,
however, defendants would be free to introduce any evidence which
would tend to disprove the alleged existence of a price fixing
conspiracy, or show that the purpose of the concerted action is not
illegal.85
This interpretation of Socony would, in practical effect, require
the trier of fact to find that 1) a combination has been formed, 2) for
an unlawful purpose which if translated into action, 3) would have
affected pricing, in order to reach a guilty verdict under section 1 of
the Sherman Act.8 In contrast, mere findings that 1) a combination
85. See Respondents' Joint Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 13 n.11, United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977).
86. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). Accord, Checker
Motor Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 405 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969).
In Colgate, the Court refused to find a price-fixing agreement when the seller
terminated a customer who would not adhere to resale prices dictated by the seller.
250 U.S. at 306. In Checker, the court upheld a plan offering a cash rebate by the
manufacturer to purchasers of taxicabs from authorized dealers. 405 F.2d at 320, 324.
Although the Checker opinion did not expressly rule out the existence of a
combination, it avoided the issue by concentrating on the dealers' freedom to
determine the retail price, and by deemphasizing the importance of the dealers in
administering the rebate program. Id. at 322.
See also United States v. Nu-Phonics, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 1006 (E.D. Mich.
1977). There, the trial court denied the Government's motion to exclude certain
exonerating evidence on the ground that it was irrelevant in light of the per se rule.
Id. at 1013. The court, concerned that the defendants be given a fair trial under the
new felony provisions of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), distinguished between
direct and indirect price-fixing agreements for purposes of applying the per se rule.
433 F. Supp. at 1011. In Nu-Phonics, Detroit hearing aid dealers had allegedly refused
to quote prices for their goods in response to telephone inquiries or to advertise prices,
and had imposed a uniform charge of $180 over cost for all state business. Id. at 1010.
There was, however, no allegation that defendants explicitly agreed to fix prices for
hearing aids in the Detroit area. The court acknowledged that when it can be proven
that prices are tacitly or expressly agreed upon, a direct price-fixing agreement exists
and thereafter the per se rule can appropriately be applied. Id. at 1011-12.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that where, as in Nu-Phonics, there was no tacit
agreement, the Government must prove both a purpose to fix prices and an effect
upon prices in order to establish the existence of an illegal price fixing conspiracy. Id.
at 1012. According to the Nu-Phonics court, the antitrust laws do not warrant the
creation of a notion of "constructive price-fixing." Id. at 1013. Rather, proof of an
anticompetitive purpose is an essential ingredient of indirect price fixing cases, and
such a purpose cannot be irrebuttably presumed. Thus, the court held that "[t]he
defendants may rebut the government's evidence of anticompetitive purpose with any
relevant evidence of their own." Id. But see United States v. Jack Foley Realty, Inc.,
1977-2 Trade Cases 61,678 (D. Md. 1977) (the court rejected a vagueness challenge to
the new felony provisions of the Sherman Act, holding that the change did not alter
or invalidate the standards or elements of proof in price-fixing cases).
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has been formed and 2) its acts, if carried out, would have affected
pricing or, alternatively, actually did affect pricing, would not result
in a guilty verdict. Nevertheless, United States Supreme Court
decisions in the aftermath of Socony must be analyzed before any
meaningful conclusions about the legality of price verification can
be reached.
Shortly after Socony, the Supreme Court decided the case of
United States v. Masonite Corp.8 7 The trial court had found that the
defendants other than Masonite each had entered into agreements
with Masonite independently of the others. 8 As the arrangement
continued each defendant became familiar with its purpose and
scope.8 9 Justice Douglas, again writing for the majority, found a
price-fixing combination in violation of the Sherman Act. He
observed that:
Here, as in Interstate Circuit Inc. v. United States, "It was
enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated
and invited, [they]... gave their adherence to the scheme and
participated in it." . . .And as respects statements of various
appellees that they did not intend to join a combination or to fix
prices, we need only say that they "must be held to have
intended the necessary and direct consequences of their acts
and cannot be heard to say the contrary." 9
Although there are references to "purpose" in Justice Douglas'
Masonite opinion, proof of purpose, in practical fact, was accomplished by substituting proof of the logical consequences of the
several agreements. 91 This is in accord with the reasoning of
Interstate Circuit Inc. v. United States,92 quoted in part by the Court
in Masonite.93 Indeed, InterstateCircuit went so far as to say that an
unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act is formed if, without
more, competitors accept an invitation to participate in a plan "the
necessary consequence of which, if carried out," is the restraint of

87. 316 U.S. 265, rehearing denied, 316 U.S. 713 (1942). Masonite involved an
arrangement by which a patentee made a series of independent del credere agency
agreements with its competitors and utilized the marketing system of those
competitors to market the patented product at fixed prices. 316 U.S. at 269-71.
88. 316 U.S. at 274-75.
89. Id. at 275.
90. Id. (citations omitted), quoting Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306
U.S. 208, 226 (1939), and United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 543 (1913).
91. 316 U.S. at 275.
92. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
93. 316 U.S. at 275, quoting Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208,
226 (1939). See text accompanying note 90 supra.
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trade. 94 Yet it is possible to presume too much by relying solely on
Interstate Circuit, because in that case the agreements, by their
terms, would have resulted in price tampering. 95 The only issue was
whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that each
participant in the agreements had unlawfully combined with the
other participants, though each had separately entered into the same
form of agreement. 96 So Interstate Circuit, and therefore Masonite,
arguably are inconclusive on the issue of whether anticompetitive
purpose is an element of the offense of price fixing.
The United States Supreme Court also gave short shrift to the
anticompetitive purpose element in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc.97 and Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States.98 In each case, subsidiaries of the same parent allegedly
engaged in price fixing and other trade restraints. 99 The Court found
that the parties formed unlawful combinations notwithstanding the
intracorporate nature of their activities. 100 In light of the Court's
more recent decision in United States v. Citizens & Southern
National Bank,'0 ' which also involved an alleged intraenterprise
conspiracy, the rationale of Seagrams and Timken is applicable only
in situations where the complained of acts by design or result curtail

94. 306 U.S. at 227.
95. Id. at 217.
96. Id. at 226-27.
97. 340 U.S. 211, rehearingdenied, 340 U.S. 939 (1951). This case has been cited
for the proposition that an agreement to fix maximum resale prices "no less than
those to fix minimum prices" violates the Sherman Act. E.g., Posner, The Proper
Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 693, 707 (1974).
98. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
99. See 341 U.S. at 595-96; 340 U.S. at 212.
100. 341 U.S. at 598; 340 U.S. at 215. See ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note' 33, at 33.
101. 422 U.S. 86 (1975). In an attempt to circumvent the state law of Georgia which
restricted city banks in opening suburban branches, Citizens & Southern National
Bank (C & S) created a holding company whereby C & S owned a percentage of the
stock of each suburban branch with the remainder owned by "friendly" parties. Id. at
89. All the participants in the arrangement assumed C & S would acquire these
branches outright when either the city limits were extended or the state law was
"altered so as to permit the accomplishment of this end." Id. at 89-90. Although no
express price-fixing agreement was entered, C & S and the suburban branches did not

behave "as active competitors .... " Id. at 112. The Court stated that C & S and the
branch banks were not independent competitors with "no permissible reason for
intimate and continuous cooperation," rather, they participated in a "correspondent

associate program" which is permissible under the Sherman Act. Id. at 113-14. The
Court upheld the district court's decision that "the lack of significant price
competition" flowed not from an unlawful tacit agreement, but "was an indirect,
unintentional and formally discouraged result of a sharing of. . . information which
was at the heart of the correspondent associate programs." Id. at 114 (citations
omitted).
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competition of unrelated businesses. 102 Nevertheless, these cases
would appear to stand for the proposition that a finding of
combination merely requires the participation of two or more
entities; and that the combination's activities for Sherman Act
purposes may be adjudged by their competitive consequences, even if
the purpose of the combination is benign or neutral at best.
The United States Supreme Court has continued to place heavy
emphasis on competitive consequences, and to deemphasize the
element of anticompetitive purpose. In Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 0 3
the Court scrutinized consignment-agency agreements between
Union Oil and over 3,000 of its dealers, pursuant to which the retail
price of gasoline was controlled by Union Oil.1°4 The defendant
maintained that such agreements were valid under contract law,1 05
and were also within the rule established in United States v. General
Electric Co., 1 0 6 that retail prices can be determined by the manufacturer if he has a genuine consignment-agency relation with his
dealers. 0 7 Mr. Justice Douglas, again writing for the Court, was
unimpressed by these arguments. After referring to congressional
testimony on the competitive surroundings of the agreements in
question, 10 8 Justice Douglas observed that the evil of the program
was "its inexorable potentiality for and even certainty in destroying
competition in retail sales of gasoline," 0 9 and concluded that it had
no legitimate business purpose outside of price fixing." 0
Like the agreement in Trenton Potteries,the Simpson agreement
expressly incorporated a price-fixing provision."' The defendant,
nevertheless, raised significant arguments which might have
negated the existence of an unlawful conspiracy in a more
sympathetic Court. Justice Stewart, in dissent, thought that General
Electric legitimized the defendant's conduct. 112 The majority's

102. ANTrrRusT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 80, at 3 (1975); ANTrrRusT LAWS,
supra note 33, at 34.
103. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
104. Id. at 14-15.
105. Id. at 18.
106. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
107. 377 U.S. at 22, citing United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
108. 377 U.S. at 18-19, citing H. R. REp. No. 1157, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1956).
109. 377 U.S. at 21.
110. Id. But see United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)
(consignment plan which had no price-fixing element was found to have a lawful
purpose).
111. 377 U.S. at 15. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 394
(1927). For a discussion of Trenton Potteries, see notes 44-58 and accompanying text
supra.
112. 377 U.S. at 26 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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overriding concern, however, was with the competitive consequences
of price fixing, a consideration which became more apparent in the
Court's most recent pure price fixing decision, United States v.
114
Container Corp. of America," 3 rendered nearly a decade ago.
In Container Corp., the Court seems to have come full circle from
its earliest price fixing decisions. The opinion signals a subtle but
perhaps significant departure from previous price-fixing and data
dissemination cases. Justice Douglas' majority opinion has been
construed as establishing a per se rule in price exchange cases, 115
although Justice Fortas' concurring opinion flatly refutes such a
116
proposition.
In ,,Container Corp., the Government alleged that leading
members of the highly concentrated corrugated container industry
had engaged in price fixing. 117 The charge was based upon the
existence of an agreement to exchange price information pertaining
to specific sales in the industry." 8 There was, however, no
agreement to adhere to any price schedule. 119 In fact, the trial court
2
found that there was no uniformity of price among defendants,1 0
prices had declined despite increases in costs, 121 and the ultimate
pricing decisions of the various defendants had been made
independently. 1 22 The trial court concluded that the government had
failed to meet its burden of proving that defendants had engaged in
a mutual understanding to use the exchanged price information "for
the purpose [and with the effect] of maintaining substantially
identical price quotations ....,,123

113. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
114. In recent years, the Court has demonstrated its concern with the anticompetitive effects of price-fixing in cases involving regulated industries and professions. See
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977); United States v. National Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975); United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422
U.S. 86 (1975); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); United States v.
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 46 U.S.L.W. 4356 (1978).
115. See 393 U.S. at 340 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also L.C.L. Theatres Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc., 421 F. Supp. 1090, 1106 (N.D. Tex. 1976), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part and remanded, 566 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1978); Associated Radio Serv. Co. v.
Page Airways, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
116. 393 U.S. at 340 (Fortas, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 336-37.
118. Id. at 336.
119. Id. at 334. This distinguishes Container Corp. from other cases where the
parties agreed to a price schedule. E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, 183 (1940); Sugar Inst. Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 601 (1936).
120. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp. 18, 58-59 (M.D.N.C.
1967).
121. Id. at 61.
122. Id. at 60.
123. Id. at 67.
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According to Justice Douglas, the fact that defendants agreed to
exchange price information was sufficient to establish a "combination" under section 1 of the Sherman Act.124 After finding conclusive
evidence of a combination, and drawing an "irresistible" inference
that an anticompetitive effect had resulted from defendants'
communications, 1 25 the Supreme Court invoked the per se rule of
Socony-Vacuum. 126 In the words of the Court, "[t]he limitation or
reduction of price competition brings the case within the bar, for as
we held in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,. . . interference
1 27
with the setting of price by free market forces is unlawful per se."'
Nowhere in the opinion, however, does it appear that the Court ever
attempted to find that an illegal purpose prompted the defendants'
action.
The dominant focus of the majority opinion is upon the supposed
economic realities in the container industry. Justice Douglas noted
that the agreement "seemed to have the effect of keeping prices
within a fairly narrow ambit."' 28 The oligopolistic nature of the
industry and the fungible nature of the product suggested that price
was the principal form of competition. 29 Justice Douglas concluded
that the agreements constituted price-fixing because "[p]rice is too
critical, too sensitive a control to allow it to be used even in an
informal manner to restrain competition."'30 In other words, the
effect of the price exchange agreements was to restrain competition,
and was therefore illegal per se.
Although the concurring and dissenting opinions in Container
Corp. agreed that the exchange of price information is proscribed if
13
either the purpose or the effect is to restrain price competition, '
such a test does not flow automatically from the case law. Yet, it is
precisely this development in the context of price information
exchanges which has created the tension in the law of price fixing.
In ContainerCorp., the Court indirectly acknowledged that mere
exchanges of price information are not per se illegal by explicitly

124. 393 U.S. at 337.
125. Id.
126. Id., citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-25 n.59
(1940). See text accompanying note 79 supra.
127. 393 U.S. at 337 (citation omitted). The Court pointed out that although the
exchange of price information may have no effect on competitive prices in certain
markets, "the corrugated container industry is dominated by relatively few sellers,"
and thus the exchange of such information tends to create uniform prices. Id.
128. Id. at 336.
129. Id. at 337.'
130. Id. at 338 (footnote omitted).
131. Id. at 338-39 (Fortas, J., concurring); id. at 340 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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recognizing that legal exchanges of such information have existed
and may continue to exist. 132 The Court noted without elaboration
that lawful price exchanges may occur when a "controlling
circumstance" exists which justifies them. 13 3 In support, the Court
cited Cement Manufacturer's Protective Association v. United
3 4 where the Supreme Court
States,1
upheld the conduct of sellers who
were exchanging price information in order to protect themselves
from the fraudulent acts of their buyers. 135 Whether the court cited
Cement as one example of "controlling circumstances" - implying
that there are others - or as a single exception to actions which
would otherwise be illegal is open to question.
The unique facts in Cement constituted a "controlling circumstance" which exempted that case from the doctrine that price
information exchanges are per se unlawful. It is uncertain, however,
whether a continuing, if not frequent, practice of price verification
for the avowed purpose of ensuring good faith compliance with
section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act is also a "controlling
circumstance."
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE PER SE RuLE IN
PRICE FIXING CASES

Certain federal regulatory statutes embody policies which are at
odds with the objectives of the Sherman Act. The United States
Supreme Court has made clear that "[riepeals of the antitrust laws
by implication from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and
have only been found in cases of plain repugnancy between the

132. Id. at 335.
133. Id.
134. 268 U.S. 588 (1924). See 393 U.S. at 335.
135. 268 U.S. at 603-06. In Cement, the Government did not allege the existence of
an agreement to fix prices, but argued only that the effect of defendants' conduct uniformity in prices - made it unlawful. Id. at 603. The Government simply asked the
trier of fact to deduce the existence of an illegal purpose from the defendants' conduct.
Id. The court rejected the Government's approach, holding that the gathering and
dissemination of information which will enable sellers to prevent the perpetration of
fraud upon them, and which they are free to act upon or not as they choose, is not an
unlawful restraint of commerce. Id. at 603-04.
In Socony-Vacuum, the Cement case was distinguished because there was no
agreement to fix prices in the earlier decided case, and a majority of the Cement Court
had found that the defendants' conduct had not unlawfully restrained trade. 310 U.S.
at 217. It can be argued that the Cement Court failed to find a price-fixing agreement
because of the absence of an anticompetitive purpose in the defendants' activities. See
268 U.S. at 601. This argument is bolstered by Justice Douglas' statement in
Container Corp. that the defendants in Cement exchanged prices "to protect
themselves from delivering to contractors more cement than was needed for a specific
job. . . ." 393 U.S. at 335.
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antitrust and regulatory provisions."' 136 In United States v. National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 1 37 the Supreme Court found
that certain agreements which would otherwise have been characterized as resale price maintenance, and thus illegal per se, were not
unlawful when undertaken in compliance with Security Exchange
Commission (SEC) regulations, because "Congress has made a
judgment that these restrictions on competition might be necessitated by the unique problems of the mutual-fund industry, and has
vested in the SEC final authority to determine whether and to what
extent they should be tolerated .... -138 Likewise in patent
infringement cases, "the limits of the patent are narrowly and
strictly confined to the precise terms of the grant ....
It is the
protection of the public in a system of free enterprise which alike
nullifies a patent where any part of it is invalid .
,,139 A patentee
140
cannot use his patent to create another, nonstatutory monopoly
because the public policy behind the antitrust laws supersedes the
4
narrow objectives of the patent grant.' '
State law exceptions to per se price fixing violations are not as
explicitly delineated in the case law. In Parker v. Brown,142 for
example, the Court construed the Sherman Act as being inapplicable
to state regulatory programs. 143 The regulation complained of in
Parker - California's program for marketing raisins - was
specifically designed to restrict competition among raisin growers
and thereby stabilize prices. 44 When the state is not promulgating a
state-wide program for the benefit of the public, but is merely
approving or acquiescing in, while not requiring the implementation
of private industrial programs, the state is really a neutral force in
the program, and its approval or acquiescence is not sufficient to

136. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963)
(footnotes omitted).
137. 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
138. Id. at 729.
139. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944).
140. See, e.g., id. at 666; United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942).
141. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1944);
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942).
142. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
143. Id. at 350-51. In the words of Justice Stone,
[lit is plain that the prorate program here was never intended to operate by force
of individual agreement or combination. It derived its authority and its efficacy
from the legislative command of the state and was not intended to operate or
become effective without that command. We find nothing in the language of the
Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a
state or its officers from activities directed by its legislature.

Id.
144. Id. at 359.
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protect the parties from antitrust liability. 145 But where the state or
its instrumentalities 146 require conduct otherwise prohibited by147the
Sherman Act, the state's overriding policy becomes manifest.
In sum, the recognized exceptions to the per se rule in price
fixing cases are well-defined, strictly construed, and uniformly
grounded upon a judicial determination that the conflicting policy
plainly overrides the policies embodied in the antitrust laws.
IV.

THE SHERMAN AND ROBINSON-PATMAN

A

AcTs:

RECONCILIATION WITHOUT COMPROMISE

In the Gypsum case, the defendants have contended that their
price information exchanges are significant, but not necessarily
required, in order to comply with the defense in section 2(b) of the
Robinson-Patman Act. 148 The defendants argue that "[i]n the
absence of sufficient data confirming the customer's claim [of a
competitive offer], direct verification with competitors was regarded
as legally important before extending a discriminatorily low price to
the customer. Such verification avoided violations of the RobinsonPatman Act .... ,,149
The Robinson-Patman Act was enacted during an era when
large retail chains with their extensive buying power had become a
threat to the survival of smaller competitors. 150 The chains' ability to
buy products more cheaply than smaller competitors enabled them
to undercut the prices offered by their smaller rivals. 15' Congress
intended the act to supplement the existing antitrust laws by closing
loopholes which encouraged predatory price undercutting by larger

145. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (utility company's
program of giving free light bulbs to its customers, approved by state commissioner,
was challenged by light bulb retailer as a tying arrangement).
146. In the Supreme Court's recent decision of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S.
Ct. 2691 (1977), it was held that the affirmative command of a state's highest court is
as compelling as a state's legislative enactments, and thus constitutes state action for
purposes of the Sherman Act exemption. Id. at 2696-98.
147. 317 U.S. at 351. In the words of the ParkerCourt, "[t]he Sherman Act makes
no mention of the state as such, and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain
state action or official action directed by a state." Id. (emphasis added).
148. See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
149. Respondents' Joint Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 8, United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 98 S.Ct. 52 (1977).
150. See ANTITRUST LAwS, supra note 33, at 155.
151. Id. According to one study, "[a] Federal Trade Commission investigation,
instituted to analyze the causal market forces in the 'independents' decline and to
propose appropriate legal remedies, concluded that discriminatory concessions from
suppliers were in part responsible for the mass distributor's competitive advantage."
Id. See M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY & H. GOLDSCHMID, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION 1096-98 (1975).
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chains.15 2 Congress' aim was to maintain a competitive economy by
53
abetting the survival of small competitors.
Section 2(b) of the Act was designed to accommodate competition by allowing a seller to equal his rival's price offer to a specific
customer, but not to permit him to undercut the offer.154 Too literal
an interpretation of the "good faith" requirement of section 2(b)
would inevitably result in formalized price information exchange
programs in entire industries for the ostensible purpose of preventing price discrimination resulting from customer dishonesty.
During the last generation, the Supreme Court has generally
been guided by "commercial reality" in deciding antitrust cases. 5 5

152. ANTITRUST LAws, supra note 33, at 156. In March 1936, the House Committee
on the Judiciary issued its report on the bill that became the Robinson-Patman Act.
The report indicated that the purpose of the statute was to strengthen existing
antitrust laws:
The purpose of this proposed legislation is to restore, so far as possible,
equality of opportunity in business by strengthening antitrust laws and by
protecting trade and commerce against unfair trade practices and unlawful price
discrimination, and also against restraint and monopoly for the better protection
of consumers, workers, and independent producers, manufacturers, merchants,
and other businessmen.
To accomplish its purpose, the bill amends and strengthens the Clayton Act
by prohibiting discriminations in price between purchasers where such
discriminations cannot be shown to be justified by differences in the cost of
manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from different methods or quantities in
which such commodities are to such purchasers sold and delivered.
H.R. RFP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936).
During the debates on the Robinson-Patman bill, the view that the bill was
intended to strengthen existing antitrust policy was expressed repeatedly. Senator
Logan quoted with approval the testimony of Mr. H. B. Teegarden given at a hearing
held before the House Committee on the Judiciary:
The bill has nothing to do with the fixation of prices. It says nothing
whatever as to the prices to be maintained or the price relationship to be
maintained as between the seller and another.
It governs only the relationship to be maintained by a seller between his
various customers. It requires him to treat them on an equal basis, subject only
to those differentials which are justified by differences in cost involved in the
differing methods of quantities in which the goods are sold or delivered.
80 CONG. REC. 3118 (1936) (remarks of Sen. Logan). Responding to criticism of the bill
regarding encouragement of price fixing, Senator Logan made the following
statement:
Those of us who advocate the passage of the Robinson [-Patman] bill have
been seeking in every way we could to keep away from fixing and regulating
prices. The enemies of the bill have sought all over the country to intimate that it
is a price-fixing bill, but there is nothing in it even remotely resembling pricefixing .... The bill points out the evils of price-fixing.
Id. at 6287 (remarks of Sen. Logan).
153. See ANTITRUST LAws, supra note 33, at 155.
154. Id. at 180. Section 2(b) was intended "to permit a seller in good faith to meet
but not beat an actual competitor's equally low price." Id. (emphasis in original). See
15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976); text accompanying note 12 supra.
155. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). In Brown Shoe,
the Court observed that the relevant geographic market in a section 7 Clayton Act
case must "'correspond to the commercial realities of the industry ...." Id. at 336
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Where price is the decisive factor in securing business, as is
generally the case in oligopolistic markets characterized by product
uniformity, the surest means of securing business is the secret price
concession. Open announcements have the effect of discouraging
price concessions because sellers realize that they are inviting
competitors to join them at the lower price with no advantage to any
of them. Price verification, for whatever avowed purpose, is
tantamount to an open announcement of a price concession. If the
seller who offered the concession is honest with inquiring competitors, prices will tend toward uniformity. More importantly, the
tendency will be for prices to remain stable, because there would be
no perceived advantage in granting secret concessions. In contrast,
if a competitor's strategy is to compete on the basis of price to
achieve market penetration, it will not be in that competitor's
interest to exchange price information with his competitors.
Logically, the "price" competitors will either remain silent or
fabricate price information in response to inquiries from competitors
156
who seek verification.
Commercial and economic reasons dictate that a continuing
program of price verification would frustrate the objectives of the
Sherman Act. The Supreme Court has addressed the potential for
economic policy conflict presented by the Robinson-Patman Act and
has stated that it is the duty of the court system "to reconcile...
[interpretations of the Robinson-Patman Act], except where Congress has told . . .[them] not to, with the broader antitrust policies
that have been laid down by Congress."'1 57 In Automatic Canteen
Co. of America v. Federal Trade Commission,15 8 the Court read a
requirement of scienter into section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act
to uphold the Sherman Act's broad policy of promoting unfettered
competition in a free market system. 159 The Court observed that

(footnote omitted), quoting American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar
Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). The Third Circuit
has recently based an antitrust decision on the "economic reality" in the industry in
which the alleged violation took place. See J. P. Mascaro & Sons, Inc. v. William J.
O'Hara, Inc., 565 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1977) (vacated summary judgment where district
court found insufficient interstate commerce in local rubbish removers' case).
156. For an excellent discussion of this subject, see Note, Meeting Competition
under the Robinson-Patman Act, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1476, 1481-87 (1977). See also
ANTITRUST LAws, supra note 33, at 182 (antitrust policy is not furthered by price
information programs).
157. Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953).
158. 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
159. Id. at 73-74. Section 2(f) of the Robinson 1 Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1976),
states in pertinent part "it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in
the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price
which is prohibited by this section." Id.
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"sturdy bargaining" between buyers and sellers fosters active
competition, 16° and thus should be limited only under the most
specific and necessary circumstances. 16 1 Since the application of
section 2(f) without the scienter element would have frustrated the
parties' ability to bargain, the Robinson-Patman Act was narrowly
construed.
Whether the Third Circuit in Gypsum, and courts in other cases
that have countenanced the price verification defense in price fixing
cases, 162 have successfully met their obligation to construe the
Robinson-Patman Act consistently with the Sherman Act is open to
serious question. Of the courts which would permit the defense, only
the Third Circuit has devised a stringent test for determining its
applicability. 6 3 Although the Third Circuit has properly carried out
its responsibility in attempting to reconcile the two antitrust laws, it
unfortunately has failed to come to grips with a number of economic
and practical problems in its approach.
As previously suggested, a continuing, if not frequent, practice
of price verification in concentrated industries is likely to result in
an orderly marketplace. 6 4 If this occurs at the primary level of
competition, that is, at the manufacturer level, the competitive
process will be arrested or restrained. No matter how fair and
nondiscriminatory the competition at other levels of distribution, it
cannot conceivably compensate for the damage which will have
been done to the competitive process at the primary, manufacturer
level, thus frustrating perforce the raison d'etre of the antitrust laws.
The potential for price tampering as a consequence of verification
seems infinitely greater than the potential for substantially
anticompetitive price discrimination in the absence of such verification.

160. 346 U.S. at 73-74.
161. Id.
162. See Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Ass'n v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 497 F.2d
203 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 999 (1974); Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742 (9th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943 (1973); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972); Webster v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 338 F. Supp.
248 (S.D. Ala. 1971); Wall Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295
(N.D. Cal. 1971). In Wall Products,the court analyzed the same verification practices
as were present in Gypsum and held that "the defendants' duty to establish good faith
adherence to the dictates of the Robinson-Patman Act, [constituted] ...
a
circumstance equally as compelling and controlling as that found in Cement." 326 F.
Supp. at 313 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the controlling circumstance in
Cement, see notes 132-34 and accompanying text supra.
163. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
164. See text accompanying 155 & 156 supra.
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Aside from these economic difficulties, the Third Circuit's
determination in Gypsum also generates certain practical problems
for courts, prosecutors, and private attorneys general. The dubious
benefit of price verification even under the Third Circuit's stringent
test must be weighed carefully against the unquestionably heavy
burden imposed upon the courts by the massive evidentiary inquiry
necessitated under the most stringest test. 16 5 The availability of a
price verification defense to price fixing, notwithstanding the Third
Circuit's stringent test, may encourage some corporate executives to
take chances, reckoning that it is probably less difficult to raise
doubt as to the customer's honesty in reporting a competitor's lower
price than it is to prove that an executive's conversation was not
limited to price verification. In short, the availability of a price
verification defense to price-fixing charges inevitably would so delay
and complicate prosecution as to discourage government and private
enforcement efforts.
Furthermore, price verification presents problems for the
antitrust counselor. Preventive law, like preventive medicine, is
beneficial both to society and to the client, and is more efficiently
administered if it is not unduly complex or onerous. In recognition of
these practical principles, antitrust lawyers generally take the hard
line and advise clients not to communicate with competitors about
price information under any circumstances. The hard line promotes
compliance with the Sherman Act. On the other hand, advising a
client that communication with competitors is permissible under
certain circumstances is fraught with peril for the client. 16 6 When he
attempts to put such advice into practice he will have to exercise a
legal judgment and not a business judgment. The probable
consequences for the business community and the public sector must
be weighed against the hypothetical economic benefits of price
verification.

165. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 10; United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977). This argument should be appealing to the Supreme
Court in light of the Court's recent decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720, rehearing denied, 98 S. Ct. 243 (1977), in which the Court held that indirect
purchasers of products, the prices of which are affected by antitrust violations, are not
persons injured under section 4 of the Clayton Act. 431 U.S. at 735. One of the policy
reasons underlying the Court's decision was that establishing damages for indirect
purchasers could severely protract and complicate litigation to the detriment of
antitrust enforcement. Id. at 741.
166. ANTrraUST DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 80, at 4. Legal counsel for the
defendants in Gypsum advised each of them that verification was legally permissible.
Respondents' Joint Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 8-9, United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978

23

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 4

1977-19781

PRICE VERIFICATION

Even good faith price verification within the standard established by the Third Circuit may have an injurious effect on the
competitive process in a concentrated industry. 167 The question
remains whether this anticompetitive effect should be excused
because the purpose for the price exchanges, arguably to promote
compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act, is not anticompetitive.
The answer, it is submitted, if not provided by commercial reality, is
provided in the price-fixing cases of the last generation. In each case
where price-fixing violations were found, the United States Supreme
Court reviewed the industrial and economic environment in which
the allegedly unlawful pricing activities operated. 68 In those cases
the Supreme Court found price-fixing conspiracies only after it
concluded that the practice was anticompetitive in purpose or
effect. 169 In each case where the Court recognized an exemption to
the antitrust laws, it has conducted a thorough analysis of the
congressional, constitutional, or state policy which arguably
conflicted with the economic policy embodied in the Sherman Act. 170
The Court has exempted practices from the Sherman Act only when
it was satisfied that the policies supporting those practices
171
outweighed the policies behind the antitrust laws.

167. See Wall Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal.
1971). In Wall Productsthe court found that price verification had the actual effect of
stabilizing or retarding the downward trend of prices in the gypsum industry. Id. at
310. Under the Container Corp. standard, illegal price fixing would have been
established. See text accompanying notes 124-31 supra. If there had been no such
effect but the purpose of the exchanges had been to accomplish such an effect, illegal
price-fixing would also have been established. However, price exchanging without
more would not have been illegal per se. See text accompaning note 132 supra.
168. See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969).
169. See, e.g., id. at 338-39 (Fortas, J., concurring).
170. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943).
171. See text accompanying notes 135-49. Conceptually, the immunity recognized
in the Parker line of cases, and "controlling circumstances" under ContainerCorp.
are different in an evidentiary sense. In the words of the Court, "[a] claim of
immunity or exemption is in the nature of an affirmative defense to conduct which is
otherwise assumed to be unlawful." Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 600
(1976). Thus, in claiming that state action immunizes its conduct, a defendant would
have to introduce evidence to support the conclusion that its otherwise unlawful
conduct is mandated by state action. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943).
Such proof would be a bar to Sherman Act liability. Id. In defending a price fixing
charge based upon price exchanges, on the other hand, a defendant would have to
introduce evidence to prove that its conduct was legal because justified by
"controlling circumstances" which preclude the conclusion that the exchanges were
for the purpose of unreasonably restraining trade. See United States v. Container
Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 335 (1969). Such analysis would perforce go directly to the merits
of the charge or claim against the defendant, contrary to the normal Parkersituation
in which the evidence goes to the collateral issue of state-action and not to
determining whether the elements of a Sherman Act violation have been satisfied. In
Gypsum, therefore, the type of "controlling circumstances" which assertedly exists
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In Gypsum, the Government presented evidence that during the
period of price information exchanges, the industry was highly
concentrated, price was the decisive factor in the buyer's purchasing
determination, and prices tended toward uniformity and rose despite
a condition of demand elasticity. 172 The defendants argued that the
173 Moprice exchanges did not result in anticompetitive effects.
reover, they presented evidence that on the advice of counsel they
174
were merely avoiding violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Nevertheless, under the standard suggested in Container Corp. that price information exchanges with anticompetitive effects
violate the Sherman Act - the jury found the defendants guilty of
price fixing beyond a reasonable doubt after digesting months of
testimony and literally hundreds of exhibits. 175 The Third Circuit
reversed, holding that price verification may be justified when it is
intended to promote compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act and
the defendant establishes his need for the price exchanges, by
showing that he disbelieved his buyers' reports of lower price offers
by his competitors, that he was unable to obtain independent
corroboration of his buyers' representations, and that his communi176
cations with competitors were strictly limited to such verification.
V.

CONCLUSION

Reconciliation of the Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman
Act must be guided by the policy of advancing unfettered competition. If price verification is salutary to the competitive process, it is
nevertheless Congress' prerogative to make it lawful. For some forty
years, Congress has failed to exercise this prerogative. Until
Congress does, price verification should not be viewed as a
justification for price tampering. Any endorsement of price verification, even under the stringent test established by the Third Circuit in
Gypsum, goes far toward striking price-fixing from the Sherman
Act.
may be regarded not as an immunity or as an affirmative defense under the Sherman
Act, but instead, as a business justification which would legitimize the price
information exchanges, not simply excuse them.
172. 550 F.2d at 117.
173. Id. at 130.
174. Id. at 120.
175. Id. at 118.
176. Id. at 126.
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